When is a Note Security by McGlynn, J. Casey
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 3 Article 6
1-1-1978
When is a Note Security
J. Casey McGlynn
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
J. Casey McGlynn, Comment, When is a Note Security, 18 Santa Clara L. Rev. 757 (1978).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol18/iss3/6
WHEN IS A NOTE A SECURITY?
INTRODUCTION
The issuing of a promissory note is a common event today.'
Everyone from the largest corporation to the individual con-
sumer participates in the making, issuing, or holding of promis-
sory notes. During the last few years an increasing number of
cases alleging security fraud violations have involved the issu-
ance of promissory notes.2 In order for the federal securities
laws to apply, the notes must be securities. Without such a
finding a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the anti-
fraud provisions contained in the Securities Act of 19331 (1933
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 19344 (1934 Act) can-
not be applied.'
The case law indicates that only some promissory notes are
securities, and the test used in determining which notes are
securities has changed radically in the last few years. The origi-
nal test, commonly called the literal approach, involved a strict
construction of the definition of security contained in the 1933
and 1934 Acts.' From a close reading of the statute the courts
concluded that under the 1933 Act all promissory notes were
securities,7 while under the 1934 Act only notes having an origi-
nal maturity in excess of nine months were securities.'
1. For an historical account of the commercial paper market, see N. BAXTER, THE
COMMERCIAL PAPER MARKET (2d ed. 1966); Johnston, Rebirth of Commercial Paper,
1968 MONTHLY REV. FED. RES. BANK S.F. For a thoughtful discussion of the present
commercial paper market, see Comment, The Commercial Paper Market and the
Securities Act, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 362 (1972).
2. Since 1972, an increasing number of cases have discussed whether a promis-
sory note is a security. A good number of these cases were brought in the Fifth Circuit.
See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l
Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1110 (5th Cir. 1974).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1970).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1970).
5. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78 (1970). A security must be involved before the courts can obtain juris-
diction over the subject matter in an action under the 1933 or 1934 Act. A number of
the cases involve dismissals before trial on the grounds that the court does not have
jurisdiction to hear the case. See Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank 495 F.2d 1109, 1116 (5th
Cir. 1974).
6. See, Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953).
7. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), reads as follows: "When
used in this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires-(1) The term security
means any note ....
8. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970), reads as
follows: "When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires- ... (10)
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
In 1972, this literal approach began to lose favor in the
courts.' Using the phrase "unless the context otherwise re-
quires," which precedes the language defining the term
"security" in both the 1933 and 1934 Acts, courts have avoided
the literal wording of the statutes. ° As a result of this depar-
ture, three tests have evolved for determining if a note is a
security.
Generally, with the exception of two circuits, the courts
facing this issue have adopted the commercial-investment note
test." This test makes a distinction between a note issued in
an investment transaction and one issued in a commercial
transaction with only the former recognized as a security. On
the other hand, the Second Circuit, frustrated with the diffi-
culty in discerning objective criteria for determining what is a
security, has set out an exclusive list of transactions which
remove a note from the ambit of securities laws." In all other
cases it simply returns to the literal approach. Finally, the
Ninth Circuit has developed a test that emphasizes the import-
ance of risk and sees this as the determining factor. 3
This comment will examine the various approaches uti-
lized by the courts in resolving the question of when a note
becomes a security. Initially, it will discuss the literal ap-
proach, its statutory underpinnings, its application in early
cases, and its ultimate rejection. Following this discussion, the
focus will shift to an analysis of the three tests outlined above,
which have emerged in the wake of the demise of the literal
approach. Finally, it will assess the efficacy of these new tests
and suggest how they might be harmonized to produce more
consistent results.
THE LITERAL APPROACH
Both the 1933 and 1934 Acts require a transaction involv-
The term 'security' means any note .... but shall not include . . . any note ...
which has a maturity at the time of issuance not exceeding nine months. ...."
9. Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971), is the last
circuit decision which can be construed as applying the literal approach. Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972), applied the commercial-investment
note test, is presently used in a majority of circuits.
10. See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1973).
11. For a case applying an analogous "investment" analysis, see SEC v. World
Radio Mission, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95751
(1st Cir. 1976).
12. See Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95614 (2d Cir. 1976).
13. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
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ing a security before federal subject matter jurisdiction at-
taches. 4 Thus, if a note was issued to an investor as part of a
scheme to defraud, the first hurdle to a successful cause of
action under the federal securities laws would be to show that
the note was, in fact, a security.
For many years the courts took a literal approach in deter-
mining which promissory notes were securities. Using this test,
the courts read the wording of the statutes very closely and
concluded that all notes were securities under the 1933 Act
while only notes with original maturity exceeding nine months
were securities under the 1934 Act. A look at the statutory
wording of these two Acts is required to understand the ration-
ale of these early decisions.
The 1933 Act
Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act states that "unless the context
otherwise requires-(1) The term 'security' means any note
... ,,,1 Read literally, this language includes all promissory
notes within the term security. A later section of the Act ex-
empts notes having an original maturity under nine months
(short-term notes) from the registration provisions of the Act,
but that section deals only with the filing requirements of the
Act and does not redefine the term security to exclude short-
term notes."5 Since the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 Act
expressly apply to all securities, both long-term and short-term
notes would seem to be protected. Indeed, under the literal
approach, all promissory notes are covered by section 12(2)"7
which creates a private cause of action for those securities sold
on the basis of false or misleading prospectuses or oral commu-
nications. Also, all securities are literally included under the
protection of Section 17,' s which uses language similar to that
contained in rule 10b-5.'1
14. A federal court has subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 10b-5 only if the
fraud is in connection with the purchase or sale of a security. See Movielab, Inc. v.
Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 1971). For a court to have jurisdiction
under § 12(2) or § 17(a), the fraud must be in connection with an offer or sale of a
security. 15 U.S.C. §§ 771(2), 77q(a) (1970).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
16. "Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this subchapter
shall not apply to any of the following classes of securities:. . .(3) Any note. . . which
arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be used
for current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not
exceeding nine months .... " 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1970).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (2) (1970).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
19. It is not clear if a private right of action is available under § 17(a), although
1978]
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The 1934 Act
The Securities Act of 1934 states that "unless the context
otherwise requires- . . . (10) The term security means any
note . . . but shall not include. . . any note . . . which has a
maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine
months .. ."20 Again, read literally, the 1934 Act defines se-
curity as any note except those having at issuance a maturity
date of nine months or less." Therefore, under the literal ap-
proach all short-term notes are excluded from the definition of
security in the 1934 Act.
Section 10 of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5 are both keyed
to the term security. To bring an action under this section the
alleged transaction must be in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security.2 2 Since short-term notes would be excluded
from the definition of security under the literal approach,
transactions involving short-term notes would not be protected
by the anti-fraud provisions of this Act.
In summary, under a literal interpretation of the 1933 Act,
all promissory notes are included within the definition of secu-
rity. Therefore both long-term and short-term notes would be
considered securities under the 1933 Act and would be subject
to the anti-fraud provisions of that Act. On the other hand, a
literal reading of the 1934 Act indicates that only long-term
notes are included within the definition of security. Since a
security must be involved to provide subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the foregoing interpretation of the 1934 Act would exclude
all short-term notes (notes which are not securities) from the
application of its anti-fraud provisions, including rule 10b-5.
The Literal Approach Applied
Perhaps the leading case analyzing the note-security issue
based on a literal reading of the Acts is Llanos v. United
States,2 1 a criminal case which arose under section 17(a)(1) of
a majority of the few cases on the subject have held such a private right exists. The
Supreme Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores reserved this question in
a footnote. 421 U.S. 723, 733 n.6 (1975). See Goldstein v. Grayson, [1969-1970 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92645 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Pfeffer v. Cressaty, 223 F.
Supp. 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); see generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1784-89 (2d
ed. 1961). But see Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F. Supp. 890 (M.D. Me.
1971)(private right of action denied).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
21. Id.
22. See Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662, 663 (2d Cir. 1971).
23. 206 F.2d 852 (9th Cir. 1953).
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the 1933 Act. In this case, Llanos and his cohorts were employ-
ing various false representations to obtain money for their own
use. For example, to secure the funds they would tell the indi-
viduals that the money lent would be bet on a fixed football
game. Induced by such representations, the individuals would
part with money in return for ninety-day promissory notes.
Llanos and his cronies contended that they were not en-
gaged in the sale of securities within the meaning of the 1933
Act, thus it did not apply. The appellate court disagreed. After
quoting section 2(1) of the Act, which defines the term security,
the court went on to state: "In defining the word security in
Section 2(1) of the Act, Congress intended to include all inter-
state transactions which were the legitimate subject of its regu-
lation and the section should not be construed narrowly."' It
should be remembered that section 2(1) of the 1933 Act in-
cludes all notes of whatever maturity within the term security.
Therefore, applying the literal approach, these notes amounted
to securities under the 1933 Act.
In line with Llanos, most of the pre-1972 cases facing the
question of whether the issuance of a note was subject to the
protections of federal securities laws opted for this literal ap-
proach. These early cases typically interpreted the 1933 Act to
include all notes within the meaning of "security" and the 1934
Act to include all long-term notes within that definition.
25
However, this literal approach proved too inflexible and often
generated incomprehensible results depending on whether a
long-term or short-term note was involved. As a result, courts
began to cast about for a mode of interpreting the language of
the Acts that would better serve their intended purposes. 2
24. Id. at 854.
25. In many of these cases, the courts did not even reach the note-security issue.
Instead they simply assumed that the note is a security. See Titan Group, Inc. v.
Faggen, 513 F.2d 234 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Smallwood, 443 F.2d 535 (8th
Cir. 1971).
26. Movielab, Inc. v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1971), was perhaps
the last major circuit decision in support of this literal approach. A very cautious
decision, it failed to state whether all long-term notes were securities under the 1934
Act. The case involved the sale of certain corporate assets by the defendant to Movie-
lab for two promissory notes. The notes totalled over $10,000,000 and were payable over
20 years. Movielab filed a complaint alleging that Berkey had made material misrepre-
sentations in issuing its notes. Berkey moved for dismissal of the case, arguing that
the issuance of the notes was not the sale of a security under the 1934 Act, and
therefore, the federal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court very reluctantly concluded that the 1934 Act did not grant the
courts any discretionary power to construe the term security as including only certain
types of long-term notes and assumed jurisdiction. On appeal the Second Circuit
1978]
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THE MODERN APPROACHES
In turning away from the literal approach and opting for
a new methodology for resolving the note-security issue, the
courts looked to the security definitional sections in both the
1933 and 1934 Acts, which begin with the phrase "unless the
context otherwise requires-". With the help of this phrase, a
number of courts have concluded that not all notes are securi-
ties under the 1933 Act.27 Further, this phrase has been used
to avoid the long-term/short-term distinction which exists in
the 1934 Act.2"
Lino v. City Investing Co."9 serves as an excellent example
of this modern trend. In this case Lino purchased two franchise
licenses from a subsidiary of City Investing. Payment was
made in cash accompanied by several long-term promissory
notes. Subsequent to this purchase, Lino brought an action
under section 10b, rule 10b-5, of the 1934 Act, alleging that
City Investing's material misstatements induced him to issue
the promissory notes. In deciding that the long-term
notes-which the literal approach treats as a security-issued
by Lino were not securities within the meaning of the 1934 Act,
the court stated: "All of the definitional sections involved in
this case are introduced by the phrase 'unless the context oth-
erwise requires-'. The commercial context of this case requires
affirmed the district court by stating:
[Tihe definition of security in section 3(a)(10) of the [1934] Act states
that "The term 'security' means any note..." and therefore includes
some notes at the very least. Clearly then, notes issued by one publicly
owned company to another publicly owned company for $10,500,000 pay-
able over a period of 20 years, in exchange for the assets of the latter easily
fall within the purview of the [1934] Act ....
Id. at 663.
The commentators are in disagreement on how this decision should be interpreted.
On the one hand, this case fits easily within the literal approach. The notes involved
were long-term notes and under the 1934 Act all long-term notes are securities. There-
fore, according to the literal approach these notes were securities and this is exactly
what the court held. On the other hand, the court clearly shied away from stating that
all long-term notes are securities under the 1934 Act. The court refused to go any
farther than to say that at the very least some long-term notes were securities and that
the notes issued in this case were clearly within this category.
27. See Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing
Co., 497 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95614 (2d Cir. 1976).
28. See Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Koenig, 388 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336
F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
29. 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
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a holding that the transaction did not involve a 'purchase' of
securities."30
In Lino the court concluded that notes issued to facilitate
commercial transactions were outside the securities laws.
Other circuits, faced with the note-security issue have similarly
utilized the "unless" language to avoid the literal meaning of
the statute." Three distinct tests have developed in lieu of the
literal approach. 2
Commercial-Investment Note Test
Of the three variations, the commercial-investment note
test has proved the most popular.33 This test distinguishes be-
tween investment and commercial transactions in determining
whether the provisions of the 1933 or 1934 Act apply. Under
this test, if a note is issued to facilitate a sale of goods then it
is considered to be part of a commercial transaction and held
not to be a security.34 On the other hand, if there is no underly-
ing sale then the note is being issued in return for money. If this
money is used to finance a business scheme then the note is
part of an investment transaction and is deemed a security.35
McClure v. First National Bank became the first appellate
case to analyze long-term notes in relation to the commercial-
investment note test. 6 McClure involved a bank loan to a
30. Id. at 694.
31. For a discussion of how the courts have misinterpreted the phrase "unless
the context otherwise requires," see Hammett, Any Promissory Note: The Obscene
Security, A Search for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 25, 38-
40 (1975).
32. One case in 1976 took the literal approach in defining the term security in
the 1933 Act to include all promissory notes. However, this was a Georgia appellate
case. See Peoples Bank of LaGrange v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, [1976-1977 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95651 (Ga. App. 1976). Section 22 of the 1933
Act gives state courts concurrent jurisdiction.
33. See, e.g., Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); McClure v. First
Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d
Cir. 1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
34. The American Law Institute's tentative draft of the Federal Securities Code
includes not only a definition of "security" but also sets forth certain items which are
not included in the term security. ALI FED. SECURmES CODE § 297 (Apr. 1977 Draft).
One exclusion is "a note or other evidence of indebtedness ... issued in a mercantile
• . .transaction." Id. § 297(b)(3). However a "mercantile transaction" is not defined.
This has been the typical problem with the case law applying the commercial-
investment note test; the courts just assume that the meaning of "commercial transac-
tion" is clear. For a criticism of this test, see Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross &
Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95614 (2d Cir. 1976).
35. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974).
36. Id.
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closely held corporation whose stock was owned by McClure
and her ex-husband Hanslik. Hanslik and the defendant bank
represented to McClure that the corporation needed to borrow
money to pay off its debts.
Relying on the representations, McClure agreed to the exe-
cution of a long-term promissory note, which enabled the cor-
poration to borrow the money. However, the money was not
used to reduce the corporation's debts; instead the money was
misappropriated by Hanslik, with the bank's knowledge, and
used to reduce debts owed by Hanslik to the bank. McClure
brought suit in federal court under the terms of the 1934 Act,
alleging that the bank had used deceptive practices in purchas-
ing the security. She contended that since the note was long-
term, it was a security within the meaning of section 3(a)(10) 31
of the Act, bringing the transaction under its anti-fraud provi-
sions.
The court viewed the long-term notes issued by the corpo-
ration as part of a commercial transaction. Although the literal
approach would have categorized these notes, because of their
long maturities, as securities under the 1934 Act, the court
reasoned that Congress never intended the statute to extend to
a purely commercial setting and held that notes issued in com-
mercial transactions were not securities.
Cases like McClure distinguish between commercial and
investment transactions when determining if the provisions of
either securities act apply. Generally these cases find a transac-
tion to be "commercial" if a note is issued to purchase some
asset, or a note is issued to a bank for a loan, the proceeds of
which are used as consideration for the purchase of a particular
asset. A hypothetical tractor sale will serve to illustrate the
parameters of a commercial transaction.
Commercial transactions. Agri-Corp., a large farming op-
eration, buys a tractor from Harvast Day, a farm equipment
retailer, by issuing a note.3" Is this promissory note a security?
37. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
38. See generally, C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d
1354 (7th Cir. 1975); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); Emisco
Indus. Inc. v. Pro's Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95761
(7th Cir. 1976).
These three recent cases have applied the investment-commercial note test. The
facts in these three cases are surprisingly similar. In all three cases the plaintiff had
issued notes to the defendant in order to acquire an existing business or the assets of
a business. In each case the plaintiff was alleging that the sale was induced by material
omissions or material misstatements.
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The note was issued by Agri-Corp. to obtain a capital asset,
and it was accepted by Harvast Day in lieu of cash. The motive
was to sell a tractor, not invest in Agri-Corp. This type of
transaction would, therefore, be characterized by a court as
commercial. The court would simply view Agri-Corp. as having
issued the note to acquire a specific asset from Harvast Day
and Harvast Day as accepting the note in order to make a sale
of goods."
What if we complicate the facts by including a bank loan
in the transaction? Agri-Corp. issues a note to a bank for a
loan. Agri-Corp. then takes the funds from the loan and buys
a tractor. 0 Has Agri-Corp. created a security? This is a two-
step transaction, but nothing has changed from our first exam-
ple. The bank is merely acting as an intermediary. In this
situation, a court applying the commercial-investment test
would characterize the note according to the underlying trans-
action-the sale of the tractor-and reach the same result as
in the first example. Thus, in the bank-note situation, one
must look beyond the immediate transaction to the use of the
proceeds to determine whether the note was issued to facilitate
a sale."
This analysis of the hypothetical tractor sale can be ex-
panded and applied to a broader class of commercial dealings.
Consequently, whenever an entity issues a note to purchase a
In these cases, as in our tractor hypothetical, the note was issued in order to
complete an underlying transaction. The underlying transaction in these three cases
was the sale of a business. The note was being used as a medium of exchange, in lieu
of cash, to consummate the sale. All three concluded that a note issued in such a
situation was commercial and not a security.
39. See McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974).
40. See generally, Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976);,
McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank,
495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
In these cases a business enterprise issued a note to a bank for a loan. In each case
the facts were similar. The business was in need of financing to pay off existing debts
coming due and to pay the expenses of operating the enterprise. The underlying trans-
action was a sale, although the relationship between the bank and the sale was atten-
uated. The courts concluded that the note was part of a commercial transaction and
thus not a security.
In our tractor hypothetical the corporation issued a note to the bank in return for
funds. The funds were then used to purchase the tractor. In the foregoing cases the
purchaser of goods issued a note to the company selling the goods. The purchasing
company then issued a second note to a bank, and with these funds paid off the note
held by the selling company. Although there are more transactions involved, the result
is the same.
41. If an underlying sale of goods was involved, McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497
F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1974), indicates that the note was issued in a commercial
transaction.
19781
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product and the note is taken as consideration for the sale of
the product, the transaction should not be characterized as
involving a security. In such cases the note is being used as a
medium of exchange to facilitate a sale; it is being issued in a
commercial transaction. Similarly, if a bank loan is involved,
and a note is being issued to the bank to effect an underlying
sale of goods then the note is also part of a commercial transac-
tion and is not a security.
Investment transactions. Courts making the investment-
commercial distinction will generally find an "investment"
transaction and the provisions of the Securities Act applicable
when: a note is issued for cash, or a note is issued to a bank
for a loan, and the proceeds are used to finance a business
scheme, rather than acquire a particular asset." The parame-
42. The majority of cases dealing with bank loans have held that the note issued
in the loan situation is a commercial note and thus not a security. See Great W. Bank
& Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976); McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d
490 (5th Cir. 1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
These three opinions may lead the unwary into believing that all notes issued for
bank loans are commercial. Indeed Judge Wright, in his concurring opinion in Kotz,
argued that when a note is issued to a bank in a commercial loan transaction the
federal securities laws should not apply. Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d at
1260. Judge Wright presented three arguments for his position. First, he noted that
the case law has uniformly held, with two exceptions, that commercial loan transac-
tions are not securities. Second, he reasoned that commercial lending transactions are
unrelated to the abuses which the 1933 and 1934 Acts sought to eliminate. Normally,
an issuer of a security has access to and control of the information relevant to the
investment decision. Since banks are normally in a position to force disclosure or to
verify the maker's assertions, they do not generally need the protection of the securities
laws. Finally, he concluded that Congress has distinguished between the investing and
lending activities of a bank. The investment portfolio of a bank is limited to a distinct
set of securities and it does not include notes issued to a bank in its commercial lending
function. Judge Wright sought to extend the distinction between a bank's lending and
investment functions to the security field. Since notes held by a bank are a result of
the lending function they do not represent an investment transaction and are not
securities.
A recent Second Circuit decision has explicitly rejected Judge Wright's position
that all notes issued to a bank in commercial loan transactions are securities. See
Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95614 (2d Cir. 1976). In addition, Judge Wright's conclusion that all
notes issued to a bank are outside the securities laws seems to be too broad. Further,
his rationale for distinguishing notes issued to banks from all other notes is unpersu-
asive. What is it about a note issued to a bank that characterizes it as a commercial
note? It is difficult to support Wright's conclusion that a note issued to a bank is never
a security.
Although one could argue that a bank is a sophisticated holder, that it is in
somewhat less need of protection, and that it is generally a conservative lender and
limits its risks, these facts do not indicate that a note held by a bank is per se commer-
cial. However, these facts may indicate a bank's propensity to avoid investment notes.
If this is the case, the best approach would be to recognize the probability that a note
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ters of an investment transaction also can best be defined
through the use of a hypothetical.
An individual or a business entity is approached by a pro-
moter desiring to create a corporation to manufacture widgets.
After some dealing, the parties reach an agreement and a note
is issued by the promoter in exchange for cash to finance the
corporate enterprise. Is this note a security? The note was not
issued to acquire a tangible asset, although the money may
eventually be used to acquire tangible assets. The holder of the
note, likewise, did not accept the note to consummate a sale
of goods. His motive is not present oriented-to make a
sale-but future oriented-to gain a return on the money
loaned. Under these circumstances, application of the
commercial-investment test compels the conclusion that this is
an investment transaction and that the note is therefore a secu-
rity.43
What about a bank loan in such a situation? Suppose that
instead of going to a financier to obtain funds for the widget
business, the promoter goes to a bank loan officer and after
some negotiations obtains the needed money by issuing the
bank a note. Is this a security? There is no underlying sale of
goods with which to characterize this bank loan as a commer-
cial transaction. There is no way of knowing how the funds will
be used by the corporate management to change the capital
assets they purchase into a profitable manufacturing enter-
prise. The bank is essentially standing in the shoes of a typical
issued to a bank will not be a security, yet continue to analyze the transaction in terms
of one of the other tests.
43. See generally, SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95751 (1st Cir. 1976); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d
546 (10th Cir. 1974); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
These cases involved the issuance of a note by the corporation to an individual in
return for cash. In Zabriskie a real estate broker induced the plaintiff to provide money
to promote a corporation in return for a promissory note. In World Radio Mission, the
religious organization was issuing interest-bearing notes to investors to finance the
building of a religious community. In Sanders, a broker was selling commercial paper
to individuals.
All these transactions were similar. The notes were not being issued to obtain a
capital asset and they were not accepted to consummate a sale. This was not a bank
loan, where you must look for the primary transaction. This was the primary transac-
tion, and the note was being issued in exchange for cash. The individual's motive in
providing cash to finance the business was not present oriented-to make a sale; it was
future oriented-to gain a return. The individual was clearly investing in the enterprise
in the hope of making a profit. There is nothing in these cases which indicates that
the holder of the note was entering into a commercial transaction. The transactions
were profit motivated. Therefore, the notes should be characterized as investment
instruments and thus securities.
1978]
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
investor who might lend money to a promoter. The transaction
is to finance a business, to put funds into management's hands
with which they hope to create profits.44 Here courts again are
likely to look at the underlying investment character of the
transaction and determine that the note is a security."
The Risk Test
In contrast to the commercial-investment distinction, the
Ninth Circuit has opted for a risk test when analyzing whether
a note is a security. Despite a different conceptual focus, the
Ninth Circuit considers its test synonymous with the
commercial-investment note test applied in most other cir-
cuits.4" The risk test looks to whether the holder of the note has
contributed capital to a business which is subject to the mana-
gerial and entrepreneurial whims of the issuer. 7 If the transac-
tion involves this so-called "risk capital," and not simply a
risky loan, then the court characterizes the note as a security."8
The Ninth Circuit articulated its approach to the note-
security issue in Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz.49 This
case involved the issuance of a promissory note by Artco Corpo-
ration to Great Western in exchange for a line of credit. Artco
later defaulted on the note and declared bankruptcy. Great
Western then brought suit against Kotz, the president of Artco,
seeking recovery of some of its losses.
The Ninth Circuit in Great Western set out five factors
44. Recent note-security cases, using the commercial-investment note test, have
treated an investment transaction as synonymous with an investment contract. See
Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95761, at 90737 (7th Cir. 1976); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., [1976-
1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95751, at 90658 (1st Cir. 1976).
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975), defines an
investment contract and then states: "The touchstone [of a security] is the presence
of an investment in a common venture promised on a reasonable expection of profits
to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."
45. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95614 (2d Cir. 1976).
46. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976).
47. The ultimate inquiry in the Ninth Circuit is whether risk capital has been
contributed subject to the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of another. Id. at 1257.
This test is derived from a recent Supreme Court case defining investment contract.
See note 44 supra.
48. Risk capital in its most recognizable form is money invested in a new enter-
prise as start-up or seed capital. "The thrust of the inquiry under the risk capital test
is whether the investor has subjected his money to the risk of an enterprise over which
he exercises no managerial control." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION,
230 n.7 (4th ed. 1977).
49. 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
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that play a key role in the determination of whether or not an
investor has placed his capital at the risk of a particular busi-
ness and therefore, whether or not a particular note will be
classified as a security for purposes of the risk test.50
The first and most important factor is time. Although the
1934 Act's short-term (nine-month) exemption is no longer fol-
lowed literally, the court recognized that most short-term notes
are not securities unless repayment of the capital is dependent
on the success of a risky venture. In this context time is crucial
to the concept of risk because the longer funds are held and
used by another, the greater the risk of loss.
The second factor is the existence of some type of collat-
eral. The court focused on the worth of the collateral vis-a-vis
the amount of capital loaned. The lower the ratio of the value
of collateral to capital, the more dependent the lender is upon
the managerial skills of the borrower or promoter.
A third factor affecting risk is the size of the business
enterprise and its financial structure in relation to the amount
borrowed. The Ninth Circuit viewed this as crucial, since it
points to the ability of the borrower to repay."
Whether the obligations were issued to a single person or
a large number of investors is a fourth factor. Finally, there is
the contemplated use of the proceeds.2 Notes issued to obtain
proceeds used in forming the enterprise are generally securities,
while those used to maintain a current financial position are
not.
After examining Great Western's transaction in light of
these five factors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the bank
had not invested risk capital subject to the entrepreneurial
efforts of Artco. As a result, the latter's note was not a security.
As to the time element, the note was of short maturity (ten
months) and could not be renewed without Great Western's
consent. Thus, the money was not at risk for a great length of
time.
With respect to collateral, although the note was unse-
cured, the loan agreement required Artco to maintain a large
bank balance, tantamount to partial security, thereby reducing
the risk of loss. Similarly, in regards to Artco's financial struc-
tures, the $1.5 million line of credit was not inordinately large,
50. 532 F.2d 1252, 1257 (9th Cir. 1976). The case does not distinguish between
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and the loan agreement further required it to keep $4 million
in working capital on hand.
Finally, in relation to factors four and five, the loan agree-
ment indicated that it was a standard commercial loan, indi-
vidually negotiated so that it involved a single lender and not
a pool of investors. It also required that the funds loaned be
used only for working capital, thus helping Artco maintain its
current financial position.
Not surprisingly, the Ninth Circuit is the main proponent
of the risk-capital approach, since Justice Traynor of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court is commonly given credit for developing
the concept in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski.5" Califor-
nia and the Ninth Circuit, however, are not the only propo-
nents of the risk-capital approach. Several commentators in
discussing the meaning of a security have relied on this ap-
proach in distinguishing transactions which fall inside the fed-
eral securities laws from those that do not. 4 While there is
support for the risk approach, a recent Supreme Court case
refrained from adopting it.5
The Second Circuit Test
In Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., the
Second Circuit has recently offered a third alternative test that
may be utilized in determining whether a note is a security."
Exchange National had purchased from Weiss Securities Incor-
porated, a member of the New York Stock Exchange, three
unsecured subordinated notes with an aggregate principal
amount of $1 million. After Weiss defaulted on the notes and
went into receivership, Exchange National sued Touche Ross,
Weiss' accountant, for fraud in its preparation and certification
of the accuracy of Weiss' balance sheet. 7
53. 55 Cal. 2d 811, 361 P.2d 906,13 Cal. Rptr. 186 (1961). See Hannan & Thomas,
The Importance of Economic Reality and Risk in Defining Federal Securities, 25 HAST.
L. REV. 219, 231-33 (1974).
54. See Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Mean-
ingful Formula?, 18 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 367 (1967); Long, An Attempt to Return
"Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Regulation, 24 OKLA. L. REV.
135 (1971).
55. United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 n.16.
56. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95614, at 90062-63
(2d Cir. 1976).
57. A motion to dismiss was made by Touche Ross on grounds that the complaint
did not state a cause of action in fraud. This motion was denied. It was denied prior
to the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
The appeal by Touche Ross was from denial of a motion to dismiss because of lack of
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In dealing with Exchange National's claim, the Second
Circuit indicated its dissatisfaction with the commercial-
investment note distinction because of the case law's inability
to articulate the factors which underlie thistest." Therefore,
the court concluded that it would henceforth follow a literal
approach "unless the context otherwise required":
A party asserting that a note of more than nine months
maturity is not within the 1934 Act (or that a note with a
maturity of nine months or less is within it) or that any
note is not within the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act
has the burden of showing that "the context otherwise
requires. ""'
The court then proceeded to list six instances where "the
context otherwise requires" and therefore, the notes issued
would not be deemed a security. These included:
[1] the note delivered in consumer financing, [2] the
note secured by a mortgage on a home, [3] the short-term
note secured by a lien on a small business or some of its
assets, [4] the note evidencing a character loan to a bank
customer, [51 short-term notes secured by an assignment
of accounts receivable, or [6] a note that simply formal-
izes an open-account debt incurred in the ordinary course
of business (particularly if as in the case of the customer
of a broker, it is collateralized). 0
During the course of its analysis, the Second Circuit re-
jected the commercial-investment note and risk-capital tests
for what it considered a more rigid and predictable approach.'
Yet, each of the six transactions described in Exchange
National can probably be defined as either low risk or commer-
cial."2 Arguably then, notes issued in these types of transactions
would also not be classified as securities under the risk-capital
or commercial-investment note tests.
subject matter jurisdiction-note was not a security and the court did not pass on the
defenses which Hochfelder may make available to Touche Ross.
58. Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 85614, at 90062-63 (2d Cir. 1976).
59. Id. at 90063.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. If a note is part of an investment transaction it is a security; if it is part of a
commercial transaction it is not a security according to the investment-commercial
note test. Since a note issued in one of the six special categories set out by the court is
not a security, it would be viewed as a commercial note under the investment-
commercial approach.
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Three of the six categories set out in the case share the
common nexus of being collateralized transactions. 3 The
court's emphasis on collateral seems to be an unarticulated
attempt to limit the risk involved in the transaction. In requir-
ing collateral, rather than emphasizing risk, the court has
achieved a degree of certainty not present in the risk test. Simi-
larly, the character loan to a bank customer, although not col-
lateralized in the formal sense, is secured by the individual's
good name and the bank's past experience with this person.
This would seem to be a low risk transaction and inherently
lacking in investment motive. Further, the motive underlying
a consumer credit transaction is not one of investment but one
of consumption, personal use, or enjoyment."4 Therefore, a note
issued under these circumstances would clearly be commer-
cial.65
63. These are the note secured by a mortgage on a home, the short-term note
secured by a lien on the business or some of its assets, and the short-term note secured
by an assignment of accounts receivable. Two of these categories refer to short-term
notes. The court does not make clear if "short-term" means 0-9 month notes, which
will mature within a few years, or notes with a 20 year maturity.
64. For a definition of a consumer transaction, see 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970);
U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
65. In general the cases have held that a note issued in a consumer transaction
is not a security. United Housing Foundation Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 853 n.17
(1975); Lipton & Katz, Notes are Not Always Securities, 30 Bus. LAW. 763, 766-67, 768-
69 (1975); Comment, Commercial Notes & Definitions of Security Under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: A Note is a Note is a Note?, 52 NEB. L. Rav. 478, 510-11 (1973).
The Supreme Court in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 44 U.S. 837
(1975), held that "when a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or consume the
item purchased . . . the securities laws do not apply." Id. at 853. This clearly seems
to be the right approach, for where a note has been issued in the consumer context
there is no investment motive and thus no security.
The problem immediately arises in distinguishing between consumer and non-
consumer transactions. This is the same problem which plagues the investment-
commercial note distinction, however, finding an adequate definition of consumer is
not nearly as hard as defining investment. The Truth In Lending Act defines consumer
as follows:
The adjective "consumer", used with reference to a credit transaction,
characterizes the transaction as one in which the party to whom credit is
offered or extended is a natural person, and the money, property, or
services which are the subject of the transaction are primarily for per-
sonal, family, household, or agricultural purposes.
15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1970); see U.C.C. § 9-109(1).
Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 307 (E.D. Mo. 1971) is a good
example of a note issued in a consumer transaction. Here the plaintiffs purchased
lifetime memberships in a health club. To pay for the membership each plaintiff
executed a promissory note. The promissory notes were quickly discounted to a local
finance company at a substantial markdown. The plaintiffs asserted that the Club's
failure to inform them of the cash price was a material omission. The courts held that
the notes were not securities. This appears to be the right result, because the notes
issued seem to fit into our definition of consumer transaction. First, the notes were
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Finally, there is the note formalizing an open-account
debt. This type of note would, more than any other, fit within
the commercial transaction category. For example, suppose
ABC Building Company has purchased cement from Portland
Concrete Corporation on credit. Because it is unable to pay
immediately, it formalizes the obligation by issuing a note.
Such a note clearly arises out of commercial activity. The note
is not issued or accepted with any investment motive but
merely to formalize a sale and to evidence an already existing
obligation.
It is suggested that the Second Circuit in Exchange
National has drawn from both the commercial-investment note
test and the risk-capital test in selecting its six categories of
non-security notes. This court, however, has failed to present
any reasons for treating these six categories specially. In fact,
one cannot help feeling that if this test is applied in the future,
new categories will be added on a case-by-case basis. Thus, the
Second Circuit has seemingly fallen victim to its criticism of
the other tests-the court has failed to give clear, substantive
criteria that aid in determining when a note is a security.
THE PREFERRED APPROACH
In United Housing Foundation v. Forman, the United
States Supreme Court rejected the literal approach tradition-
ally used in determining whether an instrument issued in a
particular transaction is a security." The issue in Forman con-
cerned whether or not shares of stock, which entitled the pur-
issued by natural persons and they were accepted by the company. Thus, credit was
extended to a natural person. Second, the notes were issued to purchase membership
in a health club. Clearly the services purchased with this credit were for personal
purposes.
The definition used in the Truth In Lending Act differs from the Supreme Court's
holding in Forman in two respects. First, the Forman holding does not restrict its
definition to natural persons. Id. at 852-53. Under a broad reading of the case one might
argue that corporations could be consumers, but this is probably not what the Court
had in mind in defining a consumer transaction. The Truth In Lending Act is probably
closer to the Court's intent in restricting the definition to natural persons. Second, the
Forman Court also restricts its holding to the purely consumer setting. Id. at 853 n.17.
It refuses to decide whether or not a transaction entered into partially for use and
partially for profit would be exempt from the securities laws. The Truth In Lending
Act's definition of consumer transaction would exempt a note from the securities laws
if it was issued primarily for personal purposes. This seems to go a little farther than
the Supreme Court holding. It seems reasonable to hold, however, that the note is a
consumer instrument if the issuer can prove that his predominant reason for issuing
the note was for personal use.
66. 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
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chasers to lease an apartment in state subsidized and super-
vised nonprofit housing, were "securities" within the ambit of
the 1933 or 1934 Act.
Both Acts include the term stock within the definition of
a security,67 yet the Court rejected the literal reading of the
statutes and instead analyzed the underlying transaction to
determine whether a security was involved. Thus, the opinion
establishes that the name attached to an instrument, whether
stock or note, is not determinative of its characterization as a
security. Instead, the instrument and the transaction must be
analyzed together to determine if a security is involved.
The Court went on to define the essence of a security: "The
touchstone [of a security] is the presence of an investment in
a common venture premised on the reasonable expectations of
profits to be derived from the entrepreneurial efforts of oth-
ers."68 This language has since been relied on in a number of
recent cases, applying the commercial-investment note test, to
define an investment transaction."
The analysis in Forman is important in two respects. First,
by looking to the character of the underlying transaction, it
indicates that the circuits were correct in their rejection of the
literal approach. Second, by emphasizing the investment con-
tract aspect of a security, it supports the assertion that the
commercial-investment note test is the correct approach to be
used when determining if a note is a security. Since there are
basically four recurring fact patterns in the cases discussing the
note-security issue, it becomes important, in light of Forman,
to attempt to determine how they are likely to be resolved
under the commercial-investment note test. Before examining
these fact patterns, the definitions of commercial and invest-
ment notes should be recalled.
A commercial note is issued to finance an underlying sale
of goods; it is used as a medium of exchange in lieu of money.
An investment note, on the other hand, evidences an invest-
ment of money in a common enterprise with the expectation of
profits to come from the efforts of others.
67. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
68. 421 U.S. at 852.
69. The Forman case involved an investment contract as distinct from an invest-
ment note. United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). Several
recent cases have considered the investment contract test to be analogous to the
investment note test. SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95751 (1st Cir. 1976); Emisco Indus. Inc. v. Pro's Inc.,
[1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95761 (7th Cir. 1976).
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Purchasing a Business Entity
The first note-security fact pattern involves the buying of
a going business. For example, suppose Mr. B negotiates the
purchase of an athletic equipment business from Mr. S, by
paying part of the price in cash and issuing a promissory note
for the rest."0 If Mr. B had merely bought the inventory for the
sports shop from Mr. S the transaction would be commercial
because the note would be issued in lieu of cash to facilitate a
sale of goods.7 There are a number of differences between buy-
ing a business and buying goods, the most important being
management. In purchasing goods, there is only a profit poten-
tial if the buyer applies time, labor and skill. A business, how-
ever, is a self contained profit producing entity, and earnings
are possible without the efforts of the buyer.
Although there are differences between buying goods and
buying a business, almost all of the cases faced with this issue
have concluded that the notes issued were not securities." This
appears to be the correct approach. There is an underlying sale
which indicates that the notes are being issued as a medium
of exchange. Also the seller of the business, Mr. S, cannot be
said to be investing money (the business) in a common enter-
prise, since the seller's motive is to sell the business and not to
invest it in a money-making scheme. These two facts indicate
that a note issued to buy a business is generally a commercial
note.
Investing Venture Capital
A second fact pattern concerns cases where the issuer of a
note has solicited venture capital with which to start a busi-
ness, develop land, or expand an enterprise into a new area.73
This type of transaction is not a commercial one; there is no
70. There are a number of note-security cases in which a note was issued to
purchase a going business. Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's Inc. [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95761 (7th Cir. 1976) (Emisco purchased division
of Pro's with note; note not a security); C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises,
Inc., 508 F.2d 1354 (7th Cir. 1975) (C.N.S. bought business from G. & G.; note not a
security); Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973) (note issued to buy
two franchises held not a security). Contra, Movielab v. Berkey Photo, Inc., 452 F.2d
662 (2d Cir. 1971) (note issued to buy business held to be security).
71. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
72. See note 70 supra.
73. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95614 (2d Cir. 1976); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d
546 (10th Cir. 1974); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075 (7th Cir. 1972).
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underlying sale of goods, and money is being invested in the
business entity by a number of persons with the profits depen-
dent on the managerial skills of the business entity. This fact
pattern fits easily into the investment transaction and the
courts have uniformly held that this is an investment transac-
tion involving a security.
A more difficult fact situation to reconcile with the exist-
ing case law is where a business entity is issuing notes to inves-
tors but the proceeds received are to be used solely to meet
current operational needs.74 Despite the conceptual difference,
the previous analysis should produce the same result. Whether
the funds are used to expand or maintain a business is irrele-
vant, since the investors in both cases have placed money in a
common enterprise with profits to come from the efforts of
another.
Bank Loans to Businesses
A large number of cases have involved bank loans to corpo-
rations to meet current operational needs.75 These cases have
generally held that the note representing the loan transaction
is not a security. Conceptually, this fact pattern presents the
most difficulties. There is no underlying sale of goods, so it does
not seem to involve a commercial transaction. Further, there
is an investment of money with the expectation of profits to
come from the efforts of others. This fact pattern appears to
involve an investment transaction, yet the cases have held to
the contrary."
One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that the
bank is a solitary investor. An investment contract requires a
common enterprise and some of the circuits have read this to
require a pool of investors." Under this rationale, a note issued
to a single investor, whether an individual or a bank, could not
be a security. Whether or not this explanation is satisfactory,
74. This fact situation is difficult because bank loans in this situation are gener-
ally not considered to be securities. See note 75 infra.
75. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976); McClure
v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d
1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
76. See cases cited note 75 supra.
77. The second element in the investment contract test is the requirement that
the investment be in a common enterprise. SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293,
301 (1946). The conservative view, espoused in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc.,
457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972), is that there must be a pooling of funds, through contribu-
tion by a number of contributors to a common promoter with a sharing of profits.
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the case law clearly stands for the principle that bank loans to
a corporation to help finance current operational requirements
do not give rise to a security.
Consumer Transactions
In regards to the final fact pattern, the courts are in gen-
eral agreement that notes issued in consumer transactions are
not securities. 8 The Forman Court, for example, explicitly
stated that consumer notes are not securities.", The rationale
behind these decisions seems to be that the motive for accept-
ing a note in a sale of consumer goods is not one of investment,
but to facilitate the sale itself. These types of transactions,
therefore, clearly fall into the commercial category.
CONCLUSION
As indicated above, the note-security cases have generally
fallen into four fact patterns. With the demise of the literal
approach, various circuits have responded differently to these
patterns giving rise to three discernable tests for determining
when a note issued in a particular transaction is a security.
The Second Circuit applies the literal approach unless the
note falls into one of the special categories that make it a non-
security. 0 No explanation was given for the existence of the
special categories, and the court did not say if the six transac-
tions listed were exclusive. The court did place the burden of
proof on the party asserting that the statute should not be
literally applied. However, the court did not decide what must
be shown to meet this burden. Therefore in future cases, the
Second Circuit will have to grapple with the nexus between the
six categories it listed as exceptions, in order to apply the test
consistently. At present, this is the most unworkable test be-
cause it offers no rationale for its exceptions.
The Ninth Circuit has opted for a risk analysis,' a test
which is also unworkable. The court provides a list of factors
which are to be weighed in deciding if a note is a security but
it does not precisely define at what level of risk a non-security
is converted into a security. Similarly, the risk test does not
78. See note 65 supra.
79. 421 U.S. at 852-53.
80. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95614, at 90063 (2d Cir. 1976).
81. See Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).
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adequately deal with notes issued in consumer sales. A note
issued in a consumer sale can involve a high risk of default,
pointing towards its classification as a security under this ap-
proach. Yet, courts have universally held that notes issued in
consumer transactions are not securities."
The majority of circuits apply the commercial-investment
note test. It attempts to distinguish between investment and
commercial transactions. This test has also been severely criti-
cized. 3 Some commentators have accused the courts applying
this test of using a case-by-case approach and failing to articu-
late the characteristics of commercial and investment notes.84
This criticism is unjustified. A study of the case law applying
this test indicates that commercial transactions involve an
underlying sale of goods while investment transactions involve
the issuing of a note in return for cash, where the money is to
be used in a common enterprise with repayment and profits to
come from the efforts of others. 5 This test seems to closely
parallel the Supreme Court's investment contract test outlined
in Forman and the Supreme Court, in dicta, has cited
commercial-investment note cases with approval."
On balance, the commercial-investment note approach
appears to be the most workable. A court confronted with a
note-security issue must scrutinize the underlying transaction
and determine whether it falls into either the commercial or
investment category. As previously noted, the parameters of
both these categories have been well defined in the case law.
Therefore, courts utilizing this approach are not forced to grap-
ple with potential exceptions or weigh a level of risk, lending a
consistency of interpretation to the note-security issue.
J. Casey McGlynn
82. See note 72 supra.
83. See Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Touche Ross & Co., [1976-1977 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95614 (2d Cir. 1976); Hammet, Any Promissory
Note: The Obscene Security A Search for the Non-Commercial Investment, 7 TEx.
TECH. L. REV. 25 (1975).
84. See Pollack, Notes Issued in Syndicated Loans-A New Test to Define
Securities, 32 Bus. LAW. 537, 541-42 (1977).
85. The note-security cases after Forman have treated an investment transaction
as synonymous with an investment contract. See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v.
Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975); Emisco Indus., Inc. v. Pro's, Inc., [1976-1977 Trans-
fer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95761, at 90737 (7th Cir. 1976); SEC v. World
Radio Mission, Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95751,
at 90658 (1st Cir. 1976).
86. 421 U.S. at 853 n.17.
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